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account for his convenience only, and not for the purpose of making
a gift to the co-depositor. The funds shall belong exclusively to the
depositor, subject only to claims arising under other rules of law.
Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit a reformation of
the account upon a showing of fraud or mistake.
Section 10. The law shall apply to all accounts opened subse-
quent to its adoption. A depositor may subject an account opened
prior to the date of this law to the provisions of this act by execut-
ing a new signature card, witnessed by an officer or authorized em-
ployee, on any day after the adoption of this law.
Section 11. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this act
are hereby repealed.
Section 12. This act shall become effective immediately.
THE NORTH DAKOTA SMALL LOANS ACT
In an outburst of commercial recognition uncommon to this agri-
cultural state the legislature of North Dakota in its 1959 session
brought forth a series of measures concerning the regulation of con-
sumer credit. The hastily drawn Retail Installment Sales Act, passed
during the 1957 session, was comprehensively amended.1 A measure
was enacted regulating one of the newer commercial innovations,
the revolving charge account,2 and the small loan industry of North
Dakota was legalized under a North Dakota Small Loans Act."
This article will concern itself with the latter enactment, and with
the background and history necessitating its passage.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The small loan business, or the preferred term since it has reached
maturity - the consumer finance industry - has become an import-
ant factor in the economy of the United States. As of July 1960 its
outstanding credits totaled over four billion dollars.4 While this
shows an amazing increase over the past several decades keeping
pace with general installment credit,' the rate of increase at present
indicates a leveling off and financial maturity.'
Much of the credit for the development of the neighborhood
1. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 268, amending N.D. Rev. Code J 51-13 (1957 Supp.). The
original was apparently based on a motor vehicle statute and expanded to include all
goods, making for incongruities and commercially inapplicable sections.
2. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 350 (service charge not to exceed 1%9 per month on the
outstanding indebtedness).
3. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 136.
4. Financial and Business Statistics, Fed. Reserve Bull., Sept. 1960. p. 1047. Out-
standing installment credit among consumer finance companies totals $4,035,000,000.
5. Ibid.
6. Consumer Credit Expansion, Fed. Reserve Bull., April 1960, p. 3.
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"loan shark" into a nationwide corporation, and the local scandal
into a respectable financial institution must go to the regulatory
small loan act and its originators. The Russell Sage Foundation
should be singled out as an innovator and pioneer in the field. A
philanthropic corporation operating in various areas of social re-
search, its department of Consumer Credit Studies rendered it a
leader in the field of small loan legislation.7 The Foundation began
its studies in 1907 and first attempted to set up remedial loan asso-
ciations on a semi-philanthropic basis. By 1916 they had deter-
mined the demand could only be met by commercial sources.
From this determination came recommendations for legislation to
increase the maximum rates for small loans and protect borrowers
from prevailing extortionate practices." The first draft of their Uni-
form Small Loans Law was accordingly published on November 29,
1916.
The effectiveness of the Uniform Small Loan Law (USLL) as a
model for legislation can be seen in the fact that of the forty-nine
states having some form of small loan legislation today9 the over-
whelming majority are based on one of the seven drafts of the Uni-
form Small Loans Law; and of those pieces of effectual legislaton
the states are nearly unanimous in using the framework of the
USLL.
In considering the depth of the problem which faced the drafters
and the product of its present general application,"o it might be
truly said that "[T]he Uniform Small Loan Law, prepared by the
Russell Sage Foundation, has proved to be one of the most success-
ful pieces of remedial legislation in our generation."" The average
borrower, a wage earner with dependents and an income under the
national average,1- has been protected from a threat against which
he had neither the financial resources nor the financial understand-
7. See generally Hubachek, The Development of Regulatory Small Loans Laws, 8 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 108 (1914); Sisler, Organization of Public Opinion for Effective Meas-
ures Against Loan Sharks, 8 Law & Contemp. Prob. 183 (1941). Incorporated by act of
the New York Legislature in 1907, the Russell Sage Ioundation was endowed with $15
million by Mrs. Sage "for improvement of social and living conditions in the United
States."
8. Ibid. Also, Barrett, Compilation of Consumer Financ2 Laws, XIII, XIV (1952).
9. Together with North Dakota, Montana enacted -. "Consumer Loan Act" in its 1959
session (Mont. Sess. Laws, c. 283) leaving only Arkansas with no legislation in the field.
See Mors, Small Loan Laws (12th ed. 1958) for charts of the various laws in force in the
states as of 1958, and Hubachek, Annotations on Small Loan Laws (1938) for an older
analysis.
10. See Hnbachek, Progress and Problems in Regulation of Consumer Credit, 19 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 4 (1954).
11. Smith, What Lies Ahead in the Feld of Small Loans, 19 Law & Contemp. Prob.
120 (1954).
12. Kelso, The Social and Economic Background of the Small Loan Problem, 16 Mo.
L. Rev. 197 (1951). The average size loan across the nation is about $345-see note
15 infra.
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ing to protect himself. It must be remembered that the finances of
the consumer are more and more being run on an installment credit
basis."- A giant in this field has analyzed it as a need: "For phycho-
logical reasons the American people want the incentive to save
which they get by first obtaining possession of their object - be it
a home, household furnishings, an automobile, or just to be clear of
a lot of bills."14
II. THE NORTH DAKOTA PROBLEM
On the heels of a report by the state Public Welfare Board, re-
vealing interest rates of up to 300 per cent per annum on loans in
what was termed a "million dollar business" in North Dakota, the
Attorney General in 1957 insituted proceedings against the Peerless
Finance Company of Fargo.' 5 The resulting receivership for gross
violations of the usury lawsl" was upheld by the state Supreme
Court.", The size of operations and rates ranging from 149 to 277
per cent awakened officers of the state to the fact that this agricul-
tural area was not immue from the perils of the urban "loan shark".
Following through on the threat of the Attorney General to make a
determined effort to enforce the usury laws, the local small loans
industry - in a prime example of enlightened self interest -
brought pressure to bear for the passage of an adequate small loan
law.'" National consumer finance companies, which had not enter-
ed the state for lack of such a law, also made their influence felt.19
The problem was covered by legislative committee. Overriding ob-
jections to any comprehensive exception to the usury laws,2' a draft
was presented to the legislature. This bill recognized the need for a
higher rate of interest on its special class of credit"l in this case
13. The Fed. Reserve Bull., Sept. 1960, p. 1046, states: Consumer credit in 1939:
installment- $4.5 billion; noninstallment -$2,.7 billion. Consumer credit in 1960: in-
stallment- $41.7 billion; noninstallment - $11.9 billion.
14. Smith, supra note 11, at 122.
15. See Legislative Research Committee Report on C"edit Practices to the 36th Legisla-
tive Assembly (1958); Note, The Small Loan Problem in North Dakota, 34 N.D.L.
Rev. 160, (1958).
16. N.D. Rev. Code §§ 47-1409, 10, 11 (1943).
17. State ex rel. Burgum v. Hooker, 87 N.W.2d 337 (N.D. 1957).
18. See generally, Minutes of the Subcommittee on Credit Practices (1958).
19. Ibid.
20. E.g., letter from Abner B. Larson, Secretary-trcasirer of the C.C.C. -[T]he state
of North Dakota should be a shining example of protection to its citizens, instead of
legalizing robbery of many of its citizens." Minutes oi the Subcommittee Credit Prac-
tices, May 26, 1958.
21. Committee Report, supra note 15, explains:
(1) The cost of investigation is almost as high as for loans of larger amounts.
(2) If security is taken the cost of preparation, recording fees, etc., is about the
same.
(3) The risks are somewhat higher.
(4) The cost of processing numerous small payments and more numerous re-
newals is increased.
(5) More vigorous collection efforts are required.
1961]
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those loans under $1,000 and of less than 24, months duration.12
Passed by the legislature and submitted to a referendum of the
voters, the act went into effect on July 28, 1960..23
III. A BIT OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Statutes based on one or more of the seven drafts of the USLL,
which includes the North Dakota act, are complex in detail but their
provisions may be grouped under several general headings: (1)
Lenders under the law are licensed upon meeting certain tests of
fitness and their activities are subject to supervision and regulation
by a state offical. (2) A maximum loan size for loans made under
the privileges of the act is set up. (3) A maximum rate is set, usual-
ly on a monthly percentage, at rates well above those authorized
by the usury laws. (4) Provisions of the required written contract
of loan are outlined. (5) Prohibitions against subterfuge are pro-
vided. Such devices of evasion as wage buying, tie-in sales, side-
line business, and false or misleading advertising are provided
against. (6) There are civil and criminal penalties for violations.
(7) Commercial banks, industrial banks, savings and loan associ-
ations, credit unions, and other legal lending institutions are ex-
empted from the privileges and penalties of this law.
In attempting to analyze the North Dakota law, a comparison
will be made with two model acts to uncover possible areas, of
difficulty or incompleteness. Of the two acts to be used, the seventh
draft of the USLL was the last work of the Russell Sage Foundation
before leaving the field to the now well organized consumer finance
industry; the Model Consumer Finance Act (MCFA )2 4 was a sub-
sequent production of the National Consumer Finance Association.
It should be noted that in almost every change from the USLL, the
MCFA is more liberal toward the lending agent.
In the area of administration the North Dakota law provides for
revocation or suspension of any issued license on enumerrated
grounds, e. g., violations of any provision of the act. A hearing is
held on ten days notice. The hearing procedure and right to judicial
review are governed by the uniform administrative procedure pro-
visions of the Code.25 This procedure follows the USLL 6 and im-
22. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 136 §§ 3(a), 14(c); see -lso Minutes of the Subcommittee on
Credit Practices, July 22, 1958, wherein a company representative states that 24 months
should be sufficient. If a loan runs too long a time the interest burden may complicate
the borrowers immediate problem rather than solving it. However long term loans in-
volve greater profits for the lender.
23. North Dakota Attorney General's Opinion, July 6, 1960.
24. For copies, see Barrett, Compilation of Consumer Finance Laws, app. B (1952),
see app. A for the Uniform Small Loan Law.
25. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 136, § 8.
26. Uniform Small Loan Law § 7 [hereinafter cited as USLL].
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proves upon it by providing a uniform administrative procedure.
The MFCA would require a prior cease and desist order and con-
tinued violation before the hearing on revocation.2 7 Also important
to the administration of the act will be the power of the examiner
to issue administrative regulations governing particulars of the
licensees' actions. The USLL gives him the power to issue regula-
tions "in addition thereto and not inconsistent herewith,"28 the
MCFA, those "necessary for the enforcement of the act and con-
sistent with all of its provisions".29 The examiner in North Dakota
has the power to issue all regulations in accord with the administra-
tive procedure of the Code and "reasonably necessary" to carry out
the provisions of the act,"° thus occupying an apparent middle
ground between the liberal provisions of the USLL and the more
restricted authority under the MCFA.
Certain restrictions on the licensees are necessary to enable the
administrator to keep that close contact required for effective reg-
ulation. The North Dakota act would not allow the licensee to
move his office from the city without meeting the requirements for
a new license, or within the city without approval of the examiner.2 '
This follows the USLL,2 while the MCFA only requires three days
notice to the examiner and no power to restrict moving.3 The
USLL allows no loans to be made outside the licensed office,34 but
North Dakota would allow loans by mail and to residents of other
areas.
3 5
In certain areas North Dakota is more restrictive than either of
the model acts. Where the MCFA allows wage assignments under
the existing statutory requirements" and the USLL sets up detailed
requirements to protect the borrower ' North Dakota outlaws all
future assignments of wages, commissions, etc. by licensees." Both
the USLL and MCFA allow recovery on foreign loans made under
similar-acts in other states 9 where North Dakota allows no recovery
on foreign loans in excess of that authorized by statute in North
Dakota.40
27. Model Consumer Finance Act § 7(a) [hereinafter cited as MCFA].
28. USLL § 10(a).
29. MCFA § 10(a).
30. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 136, j 11(a).
31. Id. § 7(b).
32. USLL § 6(b).
33. MCFA § 6(b).
34. USLL § 12(b).
35. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 136, § 7(c).
36. MCFA § 17.
37. USLL § 17.
38. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 136, § 17.
39. USLL, MCFA § § 18.
40. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 136, § 19.
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The question which looms largest in the minds of borrowers is that
of charges. North Dakota provides for a 23% a month charge on
the first $250, 2% on the next $250, 1 % on the third $250, and
1,'o on that amount between $750 and $1,000."' The legal rate,
7% per annum, would apparently apply to any amount over $1000.2
The USLL began its early drafts on a monthly rate of 3% then
cut it to a graduated rate beginning at 3% on its seventh draft.4
It is difficult to compare graduated rates as between states since
the rates may break at different levels, the rate may vary at these
levels, and there may be a differing number of breaks. However it
may be said generally that while most states begin at a higher rate
North Dakota at least equalizes this by greater rates at higher
levels. 44
There are also certain features contained within the North Da-
kota act which are in neither of the older model acts. One is an
apparent alternative allowance of precomputation of charges rather
than the traditional straight interest; 4' another provides for credit
insurance sales by lenders to borrowers.4 6 Precomputation is a more
modern simplified method of computing charges whereby it is all
figured in advance rather than at the time of payment. However
the method has not yet received complete acceptance among the
members of the industry.4' Also in dispute and of a more intensive
nature is the validity of credit insurance sales by lenders. 48  By al-
lowing the licensees to profit from insurance sales outside the au-
thorized special rates on small loans, North Dakota has broken what
has been called a cardinal principle of effective small loan legisla-
tion: that all charges must be included in the overall maximum
charge.49  It has been argued that this too can be regulated in an
41. Id. § 1 4 (a).
42. Id. § 16; North Dakota Attorney General's Opinion, August 16, 1960. The latter
explains away a difference from the bill as recorded in the legislative journal which would
require the legal rate on the entire amount for those loans over $1,000. See also, Har-
tung, Adequate Small Loans Ceilings, 8 Per. Fin. Law Q. Rep. 33 (1954) ($1,000 thought
to be a reasonable maximum at present).
43. Barrett, supra note 8.
44. Compare N.D. Laws 1959, c. 136, § 14(a), with table 4 pp. 7-9 of Mors, supra
note 9.
45. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 136, § 1 4 (a) (equivalent interest rate per annum must also be
stated on the contract), see also Subcommittee Minutes, April 24, 1958, wherein the North
Dakota Small Loans Association asks for precomputed charges based on a given dollars
per hundred per year.
46. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 136, § 18.
47. See generally A Symposium on Precomputation, 12 Per. Fin. Law Q. Rep. 2 (1957).
48. See Mors, supra note 9, at 28-30; Seymour, Trend to Insurance Provisions in Small
Loan Statutes, 6 Per. Fin. Law Q. Rep. 33 (1952); Snepp, N.C. Insurance Restrictions
Limit But Do Not Cure Small Loan Abuses, 5 Per. Fin. Law Q. Rep. 83 (1951); Vernon,
Regulated Credit Life and Disability Insurance and the Small Loan, 29 N.Y.U: Law Rev.
1098 (1954) (the most exhaustive study).
49. Hubachek, supra note 10, at 20 "Like vitamin pills, life and disabilitity insurance
may be good for borrowers but licensed lenders should no more be permitted to profit
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effective manner" and North Dakota makes some provision in this
regard." But we have only to turn to the report of a federal com-
mittee headed by the late Senator Langer to realize the possibili-
ties of abusive use of credit insurance as a tie-in sale and a method
of evading legal rate limits.
As a final comparison with model legislation the Uniform Com-
mercial Code should be mentioned, since it is presently being con-
sidered for adoption in North Dakota. As a piece of legislation de-
signed for uniform application the Code does not supersede the
small loan or retail installment sales laws, which are of a more local
nature."3 It is rather supplementary to these acts and simplifies
secured transactions by setting up a single simplified method of
setting up security for loans."
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
When at the turn of the century the public was first being awak-
ened to the "loan shark" problem, the sporadic and divergent pieces
of legislation put forth were viewed by the courts with skeptical
eyes. The statutes, often ill-drafted and ill-suited to obtain a full
solution, were questioned and thrown out as class legislation or lack-
ing in uniformity of operation." Even those with a more compre-
hensive system of regulation and rate control were apt to be de-
clared an invalid exercise of the police power56 or abridging some
other guarantee of the fourteenth amendment.57 With the arrival in
the field of the Russell Sage Foundation and compherensive investi-
from tie-in sales of insurance than from tie-in sales of vitamin pills."; Mors, supra note 9,
at 29 "Small loan experience has shown that profits from extra charges of any kind in-
variably lead to abuses."
50. Seymour, supra note 48; Vernon, supra note 48.
51. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 136, § 18 where the types of insurance that may be sold are
listed. Size of the policy must not exceed the size of loan. The seller must be duly
licensed by the insurance commissioner. He must also supply a statement and policy to
the borrower and cannot require purchase from himself or an affiliate or decline existing
insurance.
52. Langer, Committee Reports on Credit Insurance, 9 Per. Fin. Law Q. Rep. 58 (1955).
Abusive use of credit insurance sales was found to be so widespread as to affect millions of
American borrowers. They also found a growing number of lending agencies whose officers,
directors, and stockholders also held positions in credit insurance corporations. However
most of the committee's investigation was done in states having inadequate consumer
finance laws.
53. See Uniform Commercial Code, Comment at 587.
54. Id. art. 9. See also Tisdale, Secured Transactions and the Uniform Commercial Code,
36 N.D.L. Rev. 252 (1960); Truscott, The UCC and Small Loan Operations, 8 Per. Fin.
Law Q. Rep. 100 (1954).
These requirements would give a small loan company a perfected security interest:
(1) A written security agreement signed by the borrower
(2) A simple written financing statement signed by both borrower and lender
(3) Filing of the latter statement in the appropriate office.
55. See Ex Parte Sohncke, 148 Cal. 262, 82 Pac. 956 (1905); Rodge v. Kelly, 88
Miss. 209, 40 So. 552 (1906).
56. Such was the case in Commonwealth v. Young, 241 Pa. 458, 94 Atl. 141 (1915).
57. See Massie v. Cessna, 239 Ill. 352, 88 N.E. 152 (1909) (a taking without due
process, an invasion of the rights of liberty and property).
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gations of ways and means to combat the problem, laws were work-
ed out which met with more favor from the courts. 8
The main attack on these more inclusive and carefully drawn
pieces of legislation was on the question of arbitrary, unreasonable,
and discriminatory regulation or classification. Under this heading
came unsuccessful suits on questions of due process,19 special privi-
leges and immunities,"° equal protection,"' and general abuse of the
police power.12 The basic provisions on regulation, special rates, and
exemption of other lenders, after surviving these attacks under the
fourteenth amendment were subjected to state constitutional re-
strictions on uniform rates of interest," special or local laws6 4 class
legislation," and impairment of the obligation of contract." In
each case the acts were upheld. Suits on specific provisions such as
exemption of those financing automobiles,6 7 net worth require-
ments,68 and the license payment" fared no better. The more gen-
eral and indefinite question of delegation of legislative," execu-
tive,7 1 or judicial 72 authority was submitted to the courts and once
again the answer was negative.
By 1941 the constitutionality of small loan laws based on the
USLL had been vigorously tested. Yet in the case of Kelleher v;
Minshull the Washington Supreme Court, after an exhaustive re-
view of authority, could say:
58. An example of this is found in Wessell v. Timberlake, 95 Ohio St. 21, 116 N.E.
43 (1916) (a predecessor of the USLL).
59. Morgan v. Lowry, 168 Ga. 723, 149 S.E. 37 k1929), appeal dismissed, Morgans v.
State of Georgia, 281 U.S. 691 (1929); Ex Parte Fuller, 15 Cal.2d 425, 102 P.2d 321
(1940); Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 114, 23 N.E.2d 472 (1939); Rich-
mond v. Conservative Credit System, 10 N.J.Mis. 14, 157 Atl. 446 (1931).
60. Alabama Brokerage Co. v. Boston, 18 Ala.App. 495, 93 So. 289 (1922), cert.
denied 208 Ala. 242, 94 So. 87 (1922); Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, supra note 59.
61. Ex Parte Fuller, supra note 59; Jannett v. Windham, 109 Fla. 129, 153 So. 784
(1933); Morgan v. Lowry, supra note 59; Koen v. State, 162 Tenn. 573, 39 S.W.2d 283,
285 (1931) "[Tjhe selection and classification of the object of legislation or taxation is
not capricious or arbitrary and rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference of
policy."
62. Family Finance v. Allman, 174 Ga. 467, 163 S.E. 143 (1932); State v. Hill, 129
La. 761, 123 So. 317 (1929); People v. Blumetbal, 157 Misc. 543, 284 N.Y.S. 873
(1936); Richmond v. Conservative Credit System, supra note 59; Shinn v. Oklahoma City,
184 Okl. 236, 87 P.2d 136 (1939) (a city ordinance).
63. Koen v. State, supra note 61.
64. Beasley v. Cahoon, 109 Fla. 106, 147 So. 288 (1933) (not a local or special law
nor denial of equal protection even when its application was limited to counties of over
40,000 population); Family Finance v. Allman, sunra note 62; Financial Aid Corp. v.
Wallace, supra note 59; Ravitz v. Steurele, 257 Ky. 108, 77 S.W.2d 360 (1934); Gregg
v. Personal Finance Co., 164 Mics, 392, 298 N.Y.S. 266 (1937).
65. Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, supra note 59; Bavitz v. Steurele, supra note 64.
66. Alabama Brokerage Co. v. Boston, supra note 60; Richmond v. Conservative. Credit
System, supra note 59.
67. National Accounting v. Dorman, 11 F.Supp. 872 (E.D. Ky. 1955).
68. Ravitz v. Steurele, supra note 64.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid. Also Morgan v. Lowry, supra note 59; Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, supra,
note 59; Miller v. Schuster, 227 Iowa 1005, 289 NV. 702.
71. Ravitz v. Steurele, supra note 67; Morgan v. Lowry, supra note 59.
72. Morgan v. Lowry, supra note 59.
"[Alt the present time, there is no jurisdiction in which a small
loan law whose structure is substantially the same as that of that
of the Uniform Small Loan Law recommended by the Russell
Sage Foundation in its sixth draft is held unconstitutional."'-
These acts stood up under the test of such varying and unlikely
constitutional provisions as those relating to expression of the ob-
ject in the title,71 "suspension of operation of law except by gen-
eral assembly",7' and "the sole object of government is the protec-
tion of life, liberty, and property."6 At the same time the investi-
gative processes survived the constitutional prohibition on illegal
searches and seizures. 77
Cases which have arisen subsequent to the Kelleher case have
either upheld similar laws with littlc comment 8 or have been de-
cided on more narrow issues. The provision of the seventh draft of
the USLL setting up convenience and advantage to the community
as a basis for granting or denying licenses has been upheld.79 While
limitations on judicial review 0 and provisions in conflict with more
absolute constitutional restrictions on lending have been invali-
dated.1
How then does this background apply to the North Dakota law?
The federal constitutional question appears settled, while any par-
ticularly applicable provisions of the North Dakota Constitution
are apparently within the general range of decided cases.8 2 The
North Dakota Small Loan Act by following the outlines of the
USLL walks a path within the traveled area of constitutionality.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the seventh draft of a piece of legislation tempered by
over thirty years experience and experimentation in the field, the
North Dakota Act can hardly be inadequate in any major provision.
73. Kelleher v. Minshull, 11 Wash.2d 380, 119 P.2d 302, 305 (1941).
74. Richmond v. Conservative Credit System, supra note 59; cf. Koen v. State, supra
note 61 (one object in both title and act); Morgan v. Lowry, supra note 59 (referring to
more than one subject matter).
75. Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, supra note 59.
76. Alabama Brokerage v. Boston, supra note 60.
77. Financial Aid v. Wallace, supra note 59.
78. See Peel v. Dumanit, 308 Ky. 399, 214, S.W.2d 605 (1948); Solof v. City of
Chattanooga, 180 Tenn. 296, 174 S.W.2d 471 (1943).
79. Family Finance Corp. v. Goagh, 10 N.J. Super 13, 76 A.2d 82 (1950); Family
Finance Corp. v. Gaffner, 11 N.J. 565, 95 A.2d 407, (1953) (before and after constitu-
tional revision).
80. First Industrial Loan Co. v. Daugherty, 26 Cal.2d 545, 159 P.2d 921 (1945).
81. Strickler v. State Auto Finance Co., 249 S.W.2d 307 (Ark. 1952) (service charges
in addition to 10% interest are in violation of constitutional limitation of rate of interest);
Household Finance v. Shaffner, 356 Mo. 804, 203 S.W.2d 307 (1947) (constitutional re-
vision invalidated exemption of other lenders from the privileges of the law).
82. See N.D. Const. § 20, ". . . nor shall any citizen or class of citizens be granted
privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens.";
and § 70, ". . . where a general law can -be made applicable, no special law shall be
enacted; nor shall the legislative assembly indirectly enact such special or local law."
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The questioned provisions regarding insurance must be tested and
scrutinized by able administration, as should determination of rates.
For only by experience and more complete statistics can it be de-
termined what is fair for both borrowers and lenders of this
region.8 3  Indeed, this is the heart of effective regulation of con-
sumer finance: able administration ' coupled with the development
of an enlightened industry which disciplines and advances itself
into a financial institution rather than an economic blight."'
While North Dakota can look with a good measure of pride on its
new legislation, it should be noted that those who are considered
"thinkers" in the field advocate the formulation of a consumer credit
code8 6 abolishing the gaps and inconsistencies of separate and not
always coordinated pieces of legislative enactment. If this then be
the direction of the future it must be seriously considered by for-
ward looking lawmakers.
J. PHILLIP JOHNSON.
SEARCH AND SEIZURES: 1960
The right of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure has
always been one of the cornerstones of the American constitutional
system. In 1960 the Supreme Court of the United States handed
down three decisions that profoundly affected this fundamental
principle of law. On the one hand the Court substantially strength-
ened the protection of the Fourth Amendment so far as state offi-
cers are concerned by repudiating the so-called "silver platter" doc-
trine,' under which evidence obtained by these officers in an illegal
fashion was nonetheless admissible in the federal courts. Conversely
the decisions upholding the right of compulsory inspection by state
83. See Miller, The Economics of Fair Charges, 16 Mo. L. Rev. 274 (1951). The small
loan laws are virtually alone in requiring that all charges be denominated interest. Other
lending agencies charge the ordinary contract rate of interest and charge separately for
services.
84. See Sullivan, Administration of a Regulatory Small Loan Law, 8 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 146 (1941). While the North Dakota act went into effect in July 1960 it was not
until August that funds were available for administration, leaving issuance of licenses until
October. Letter from Alf Hager, Deputy Examiner, Small Loans Division, Oct. 31, 190.
85. Hubachek, The Development of Regulatory Small Loan Laws, 8 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 108, 126 (1941) "Morality has been achieved in this business not by the mere
passage of a law but by fostering a remedial business which, from enlightened self interest
polices its own area with everlasting vigilance and vigor."; Redfield, The Responsibility of
all Consumer Lending Agencies to Help Eliminate the Loan Shark Evil, 19 Law & Con-
temp. Prob. 104 (1954).
86. Henderson, The Future of the Loan Shark and Consumer Credit Agencies, 19 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 127 (1954); Hubachek, The Drift Toward a Consumer Credit Code,
16 U. Chi. L. R, 609 (1949).
1. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78 (1948). Stated "The crux of that doctrine
is that a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search
by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal
authorities on a silver platter" (Felix Frankfurter for the majority).
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